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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOYCE ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 920197 
Category No. 15 
Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Supreme Court of Utah 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
(See caption.) 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether, despite the lack of a requirement in federal or state 
law, the Utah Medicaid program should be forced to adopt "resource 
spend down." 
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF ANY OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, Case No. 910287-CA (Utah Ct. 
App. filed Mar. 17, 1992). 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari seeks review of a 
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 1992. Review is 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-4 (1992) and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 45. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Administrative Code R810-304-411.1 (1991): 
Allow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases 
other than Indigent Medical cases. . . . 
1. One Home and Lot - All Cases 
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and lot owned or 
being purchased and occupied the client. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(d): 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important reasons. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme 
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons 
that will be considered: 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has 
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396A(A)(34) (Law. Co-op. 1985). 
(Appendix). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Allen sought reversal of the "Final 
Agency Action and Order on Review,M finding Petitioner Doyce Allen 
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(Allen) ineligible for Medicaid benefits based on his assets of 
$10,745.90, which exceed the asset limit of $3,000.00. R. 94-106. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the agency decision. Allen v. Utah Deot. of Health, 182 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1992). 
C. Relevant Facts. Allen's resources at the time of 
application were $10,745.90 and the resource limit was $3,000.00. 
R. 113; Allen at 39. The 1981 travel trailer was valued at 
$7,000.00. R. 98; Allen at 2.1 DHCF agrees with all other facts 
as presented in the Petition. 
ARGUMENT 
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW IS 
PRESENTED TO JUSTIFY REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS THAT NEITHER FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW NOR 
STATE LAW MANDATES A "RESOURCE SPEND DOWN" RULE. 
Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth 
the only plausible standard for the granting of Allen's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. This exercise of judicial discretion is 
1
 In his petition, Allen asserts, "Allen's liquid assets put 
him $129.00 over the limitf not counting his vehicles which were 
arguably exempt." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11. The Court 
of Appeals found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the 
exemption, since the bank account alone put Allen over the limit. 
Allen, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 at 40 n.4 (Utah App. 1992). The 
exemption could only be upheld if found to be a medical necessity, 
since it is outfitted with oxygen tanks. Allen claims it is used 
for transportation, but it is really a second home in a warmer 
climate, and Medicaid regulations are very clear that only one home 
may be exempted. Utah Admin Code R810-304-411.1 (1991). 
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reserved for those cases where a special and important reason is 
presented. In this case, no such question exists, because the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision is in harmony with prevailing law 
throughout the country. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that federal law does 
not mandate a "resource spend down" in determining Medicaid 
eligibility. Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
at 40 (Utah App. 1992). In reaching this conclusion, the majority 
panel examined the legislative history accompanying 42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(a) (17) as revealed in S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, and 
found that it points only to "income spend down" as being mandatory 
under federal law. Allen at 40 n.10. After analyzing case law 
from throughout the country, the Court of Appeals stated: "Courts 
conclude that federal Medicaid regulations permit, but do not 
require, states to employ "resource spend down." Id. at 40 n.ll. 
In his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Allen claims that 
"resource spend down" is required by the federal statutory scheme 
for a determination of eligibility to be reasonable, and that the 
Court of Appeals erred in failing to so find. However, Allen fails 
to point to any explicit supportive language in any federal 
statute. Rather, Allen requested the Court of Appeals to infer 
Congressional intent. The Court of Appeals properly declined, 
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having found that the legislative history did not support Allen's 
position. Id. at 40. In response to the reasonableness question, 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was 
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt 
"resource spend down" in an otherwise completely optional 
state benefit plan. The express [state] legislative 
concern is for economy and efficiency in implementing a 
Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this line-drawing 
offends the legislative delegation of power. 
Id. at 41. It is also worth noting that Utah operates its Medicaid 
program, without a "resource spend down" policy, pursuant to a 
State plan that is approved on a yearly basis by the Federal Health 
Care Financing Administration. 
In Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1991), the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found no federal or state law 
requiring the use of a "resource spend down" rule in determining 
eligibility for Medicaid in Maine. Id. at 1055 n.2. In Haley v. 
Commissioner of Public Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572 
(1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts closely 
examined both federal and its own state Medicaid laws and concluded 
that "resource spend down" was not mandated by federal law. Haley, 
476 N.E.2d at 578. In Hession v. Illinois Department of Public 
Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989), the Illinois court 
likewise held that federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not 
require, "resource spend down." Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 757. 
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In the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Allen acknowledges 
that Utah has never adopted the "resource spend down" option by 
statute or agency rule. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8. 
After finding that "resource spend down" is only mandated when 
state law requires it, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
Utah does not have such a saving "resource spend down" 
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of 
policy expressing a desire to preserve the resources of 
potential beneficiaries. Utah's statutes, particularly 
those outlining the DHCF's authority, seem to evince a 
legislative concern for economy and efficiency in the 
Medicaid program, not the preservation of applicants' 
assets. Jurisdictions requiring "resource spend down." 
on the contrary, appear concerned about preserving the 
limited assets of Medicaid applicants. 
Allen, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (footnotes omitted). 
The Utah Court of Appeals then correctly noted that "a 
determination of the eligibility criteria for Medicaid benefits is 
not one for the courts to make." Id. at 42 n.18. Any other 
finding would violate the well-established doctrine of separation 
of powers. While addressing precisely the same issue, the court in 
Bemowski v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 
A.2d 103, 106 (1990), said, "such a change in the eligibility 
criteria for MA benefits by persons in the medically needy category 
must be made legislatively or by regulation, not judicially." 
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers bars the courts 
from mandating an increase in the allocation of monies to respond 
to the expanding numbers of eligible individuals occasioned by such 
- 6 -
a ruling changing eligiblity criteria. Since more people would be 
eligible for benefits if an applicant could spend down resources 
after application and still acquire Medicaid eligibility as of the 
date of filing, either the extent of seirvices to all Medicaid 
recipients would have to be reduced or the legislature would have 
to appropriate a larger portion of the state budget to Medicaid to 
maintain services to recipients at present levels, 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied based 
upon the lack of any special or important question of federal or 
state law that justifies review of the decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals decision in this case, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 'S ^day of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
c / 
Douglas W. Sprin4meye 
Assistant Attorney Ge, 
Human Services Division 
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APPENDIX 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Doyce ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Division of Health Care Financing, 
Respondent. 
No. 910287-CA 
FILED: March 17, 1992 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from 
a final order of respondent Utah Department 
of Health, Division of Health Care Financing 
(DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart 
attack while in Arizona. He was subsequently 
transported to Utah where he underwent heart 
bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs 
exceeding $40,000.00. At the time of his heart 
attack, Allen had no health insurance and was 
ineligible for Medicare assistance because he 
was not sixty-five years old. 
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on 
February 4, 1991, seeking retroactive coverage 
to include medical bills incident to his heart 
surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid 
guidelines require that Allen's assets be less 
than $3,000.00, on the first of each calendar 
month, to qualify for medical assistance. In 
both January and February, Allen owned a 
savings account in the amount of $3,029.86, a 
checking account in the amount of $100.00, a 
Lincoln automobile valued at approximately 
$600.00, a 1983 Ford pickup truck valued at 
approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel 
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00. 
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family 
Support denied Allen's Medicaid application, 
finding his resources exceeded the $3,000.00 
limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after 
which a DHCF hearing officer sustained the 
denial on the ground that Allen's "'savings 
account alone exceeded the limit * On An«*i 
29, 1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency 
Action and Order on Review, adopting the 
findings and conclusions of the hearing 
officer. Allen then filed a Request for Reco-
nsideration which was denied. 
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in 
denying his Medicaid application because: (1) 
The savings account funds are designated for 
burial expenses and, thus, exempt from cons-
ideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel 
trailer, modified to accommodate his wife's 
disabilities, is a medical necessity or personal 
effect and, thus, exempt from consideration 
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have 
been permitted to "spend down" his assets, by 
applying them to medical bills, in order to 
become eligible for Medicaid. 
I. THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A 
BURIAL FUND 
Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings 
account should not be included for purposes 
of Medicaid eligibility because it is exempt as 
a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen 
points to a statement in his will directing that 
the savings account be used "to bury Doyce 
Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the will is 
properly before this court on appeal because it 
was submitted to the DHCF with his Request 
for Reconsideration. The DHCF responds that 
it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's 
will as part of the record on review because it 
was never introduced as evidence at Allen's 
formal administrative hearing. 
A review of the record reveals that a copy 
of Allen's will was first presented to the 
DHCF as an attachment to a letter from 
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, reques-
ting a transcript of Allen's administrative 
hearing. The DHCF did not receive the will 
until June 10, 19912, after the hearing 
officer's Recommended Decision, the 
DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on 
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request 
for Reconsideration had already been signed 
and dated. Because there is no indication that 
Allen's will was ever included as evidence 
before the DHCF, it is not properly a part of 
Allen's record on appeal. 
However, even if we were to consider the 
general language in Allen's will, the result 
would not be different. Allen clearly and 
unequivocally testified the account was to pay 
for insurance premiums, not burial expenses. 
Allen did not specify the account as a burial 
fund on his original Medicaid application. 
During his formal administrative hearings. 
Allen did not argue or present any evidence 
indicating his savings account was designated 
for burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing 
officer specifically asked if the savings account 
might be a burial fund, Allen replied that "we 
earned it last summer for our insurance pre-
miums, and they didn't go through, so we had 
ttiic m n n a u fVx«» « « » * «^»<» ..*«... *>••!•* -—— v - -
40 Allen v. Utah Department of Health 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
CODE• CO 
Provo, Utah 
have to have a little bit of something in case--
."
3
 Therefore, considering only the savings 
account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, 
Allen's savings account alone surpassed the 
$3,000.00 Medicaid limit. 
n. MEDICAID "SPEND DOWN" 
A. An Overview of the Medicaid Program 
Allen alternatively argues that he should 
have been permitted to spend his assets on 
medical bills in order to qualify for Medicaid. 
We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid 
regulations to resolve this question. 
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid 
program as Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act.5 Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state 
program providing federal funds to assist 
individuals "whose income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary 
medical services." 42 U.S.C. §13% (1992). 
States choosing to participate in this optional 
program are reimbursed for a portion of their 
costs in providing medical treatment to needy 
persons. See Atkins v. Rivera, All U.S. 154, 
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber 
Memorial Care Ctr., Inc. v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Participating states must develop a plan that 
complies with all federal Medicaid regulations. 
See 42 U.S.C. §1396; Atkins, All U.S. at 
157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 
P.2d at 832. Each state must also select a 
single agency "to administer or to supervise 
the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(a)(5) (1992). In determining eligibility 
for its program, a state must provide benefits 
to the "categorically needy"* but may provide 
benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its disc-
retion.* 
B. The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal 
Medicaid Statutes 
When a "medically needy" applicant's 
income or resources exceed the applicable 
state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the "spend 
down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the 
applicant may be able to "spend down" excess 
income or assets, by applying them to outst-
anding medical bills, to become eligible for 
Medicaid. 
In determining whether the federal Medicaid 
program requires states to adopt the "spend 
down" rule, courts have focused on the foll-
owing portion of the Medicaid statutes: 
(a) A State plan for medical assist-
ance must 
(17) ... include reasonable stan-
dards ... for determining eligibility 
for and the extent of medical assi-
stance under the plan which (A) are 
consistent with the objectives of this 
subchapter, (B) provide for taking 
into account only such income and 
resources as are ... available to the 
applicant or recipient ... (C) provide 
for reasonable evaluation of any 
such income or resources, and (D) 
... provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with 
respect to income by taking into 
account ... the costs ... incurred for 
medical care or for any other type 
of remedial care recognized under 
State law. 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis 
added). Courts recognize section 17(D) as the 
"income spend down rule," finding that state 
plans must permit a Medicaid applicant to 
"spend down" or deplete excess income to 
comply with a state's eligibility standards.9 
The question in the present case, however, is 
whether the federal Medicaid regulations also 
require states to allow an applicant to "spend 
down" excess resources in the same manner. 
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid 
program requires states to implement 
"resource spend down" because it is necessary 
to fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program 
and is reasonable. The DHCF responds that 
federal Medicaid regulations mandate "income 
spend down" but merely permit states to inc-
orporate "resource spend down" within their 
plans at their discretion. 
Courts considering the issue agree with the 
DHCF, finding the express statutory mandate 
is limited to "income spend down."10 Courts 
conclude that federal Medicaid regulations 
permit, but do not require, states to employ 
"resource spend down."11 We agree and con-
clude "resource spend down" is not mandated 
by federal law. 
C. Utah's Medicaid Program 
Since Utah may implement "resource spend 
down" at its discretion, we must determine 
whether the Utah Medicaid plan has, in fact, 
adopted "resource spend down" in determining 
Medicaid eligibility. Utah courts have never 
addressed Medicaid "spend down" issues. 
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid 
program with the adoption of the Medical 
Assistance Act in 1981.12 Utah has complied 
with federal requirements by creating a state 
plan13, which has been approved by the Secr-
etary of Health and Human Services, and 
designating the DHCF as the agency respons-
ible for Medicaid administration.14 Utah's 
statutes describe the DHCF's responsibilities, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
[T]he division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administra-
tion of this chapter in an efficient, 
economical manner. The division 
shall establish, on a statewide basis, 
a program to safeguard against 
CODE*co Allen v. Utah Department 
Provo, Uuh 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
unnecessary or inappropriate use of 
Medicaid services, excessive paym-
ents, and unnecessary or inappro-
priate hospital admissions or lengths 
of stay. 
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-2.3(1) (1989). 
(2) The department shall develop 
implementing policy in conformity 
with this chapter, the requirements 
of Title XIX, and applicable federal 
regulations. 
Utah Code A n n . § 2 6 - 1 8 - 3 ( S u p p . 
1991)(emphasis added). 
The department may develop stan-
dards and administer policies rela-
ting to eligibility under the Medi-
caid program. 
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-4(1) (1989). 
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regul-
ation, or rule indicating that the Utah legisl-
ature has adopted "resource spend down" in 
determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen 
posits a more delicate argument which goes 
beyond literal statutory language. Specifically, 
Allen contends that Utah will not be following 
the federal requirement to use "reasonable 
standards" in determining Medicaid eligibility 
unless it applies "resource spend down." 
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's 
Medicaid plan designates certain assets as 
exempt in determining eligibility for the 
"medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that 
Utah has tacitly adopted a policy of allowing 
"medically needy" Medicaid applicants to 
maintain a level of income and resources for 
the necessities of life while still qualifying for 
Medicaid. 
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases 
from other jurisdictions which, he argues, 
require "resource spend down" because, like 
Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medi-
caid eligibility determination. We read these 
cases differently. Courts in these jurisdictions 
have found a state mandate for "resource 
spend down" based on a specific legislative 
directive within their Medicaid plans, not just 
on the practice of allowing exemptions. 
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public 
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572 
(1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass-
achusetts closely examined both federal and its 
own state Medicaid laws to determine if 
"resource spend down" was mandated or 
simply permitted. The court, first, determined 
that, although the federal statutes did not 
require "resource spend down," it was a rea-
sonable method of calculating resources and 
"consistent with the goals of Title XIX." id., 
476 N.E.2d at 578. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that it "must determine independently 
whether the Legislature intended to require the 
use of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. 
The court found a statute "explicitly 
appl[ying] a resource spend down," id. n.9, as 
evidence of "the legislature's determination to 
ensure an individual's retention of a certain 
level of resources." Id. at 579. The court, 
thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid 
plan required "resource spend down." 
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an 
analysis similar to that of the Haley court in 
Hession v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 
129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After 
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes 
permit, but do not require, "resource spend 
down," the court turned its attention to the 
Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized 
that the plan included a provision whereby 
$1,500 in assets is exempt from Medicaid eli-
gibility determination. However, the court, 
relying upon a specific Illinois statute, also 
stated: "In establishing an assistance program 
for these individuals, the legislature has noted 
that it is of special importance that their inc-
entives for continued independence be maint-
ained and that their limited resources be pre-
served." Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111. 
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on 
this clear manifestation of legislative intent, 
the court held that the Illinois Medicaid plan 
required "resource spend down." 
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource 
spend down" provision in its Medicaid plan, 
nor any statement of policy expressing a desire 
to preserve the resources of potential benefi-
ciaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those 
outlining the DHCF's authority17, seem to 
evince a legislative concern for economy and 
efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the 
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdict-
ions requiring "resource spend down," on the 
contrary, appear concerned about preserving 
the limited assets of Medicaid applicants. 
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot 
say it was unreasonable for the DHCF to 
choose not to adopt "resource spend down" in 
an otherwise completely optional state benefit 
plan. The expressed legislative concern is for 
economy and efficiency in implementing a 
Medicaid program, and we cannot see how 
this line-drawing offends the legislative del-
egation of power. 
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to 
that of Maine, recently reviewed in Harriman 
v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1991). 
In Harriman, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine recognized that its state plan does not 
include "resource spend down." "If the assets 
of applicants exceed the specified dollar limit, 
they are ineligible for assistance under the 
medically needy program, regardless of the 
amount of their medical expenses." Id. at 
1056. Noting that "[tjhe overall effect was to 
restrict as much as possible the number of 
eligible Medicaid recipients," the court stated: 
"For whatever reason-whether to achieve 
cost containment or to comDlv onlv with th* 
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the legislature stopped short of enacting an 
asset spend-down." Id. at 1057 (footnote 
omitted). 
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing m 
the Utah Medicaid plan or its regulations that 
requires the utilization of "resource spend 
down."" Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings 
account at the time he applied for Medicaid. 
The DHCF, thus, correctly determined he was 
ineligible for Medicaid benefits as Utah has 
not adopted a "resource spend down" system. 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 
burial or funeral fund exemption for each eligible 
household member" is permitted only if these funds 
"are separately identified and not commingled with 
other funds. They must be clearly designated so that 
an outside observer can see that these funds are 
specifically for the client's burial expense " Utah 
Code Admin. P. R810-304-4ll(9)(e)(l) (1991) 
2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time 
when the record was still open," pointing out that 
the letter to which the will was attached was mailed 
on June 3, 1991. The letter, nevertheless, clearly 
bears a "Received June 10,1991" stamp. 
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF demed 
Medicaid benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain 
the account as a burial fund. The following exch-
ange occurred at the administrative hearing: 
HEARING OFFICER. What did you do 
with the $3,000 m February which you 
pulled out of the savings account? 
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that 
was accrued dunng our heart attack deal 
here, and transportation to and from. 
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money 
was spent on medical things? 
MR. ALLEN: Bills again. 
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently 
neither considered nor used the savings account as a 
fund "separately identifiable" which was set aside 
"specifically" for burial expenses. 
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped 
with oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport 
Allen and his wife to a warmer climate dunng 
winter because of his wife's ill health, should be 
excluded from Medicaid eligibility consideration 
because they are exempt either as personal effects or 
medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-
304-411(4), (5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen 
asserts that, because his wife requires the truck and 
travel trailer for health reasons, neither vehicle is 
"available" to him, as contemplated by federal sta-
tutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(aX17XB) (1992) We find it unnecessary to 
reach these issues m view of our determination that 
Allen's savings account alone exceeded the Medicaid 
eligibility limit. 
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§1396, et seq. (1992)). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(i). 
7. See42U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10XAXu). 
8. The Umted States Supreme Court explained this 
distinction in Schweiker v fforan. 457 U.S. 569. 
trtment of Health CODE«C 
v Rep 39 Provo Um 
102 S Ct 2597(1982)* 
Congress has differentiated between the 
categorically needy-a class of aged, 
bund, disabled, or dependent persons 
who have very little income--and 
other persons with similar characteristics 
who are self-supporting Members of 
the former class are automatically enti-
tled to Medicaid; members of the latter 
class are not eligible unless a State elects 
to provide benefits to the medically 
needy and unless then* income, after 
consideration of medical expenses, is 
below state standards of eligibility 
Jd., 457 U.S at 590,102 S Ct at 2609 
9 See, e.g., Atkins, 477 U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct a 
2459 ("the spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S C 
§1396a(aX17)" allows the medically needy to spen 
down "the amount by which their income exceeds 
the eligibility level); Foley v Coler, No 83-C 
4736, 1986 WL 20891 ( N D 111 Oct 1, 1986X"4 
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to us 
income spend-down"); Hamman v Commissionei 
No 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me. Nov S 
1990)(42 U . S C §1396a(a)(17)(D) "specificall 
requires the state to have an mcome spend-dow 
rule"); Walter O. Boswell Memorial Hosp., Inc \ 
Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d 878, 88 
(Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementin 
[42 U S.C. §1396a(17)] expressly require deductio 
of incurred medical bills from mcome for purpose 
of determining eligibility."); Ramsey v Depamner 
of Human Servs., 301 Ark. 285, 783 S.W 2d 361 
363 (1990X"Under the 'medically needy' procedure 
applicants are permitted to 'spend down' thei 
excess mcome for medical expenses."), Haley t 
Commissioner of Pub Welfare, 394 Maj>s. 466, 47 
N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(n 
"provide[s] for application of the spend down pn 
nciple to mcome eligibility determinations"); Kemp 
son v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Rei 
ources, 100 N C. App. 482, 397 S.E.2d 314, 31 
(1990XThe "explicit reference to income [in 4 
U.S.C. §1396a(aX17)(D)] has been interpreted b 
the courts to mean that 'mcome spend-down' i 
allowed by the statute."), afVd, 328 N C. 722, 40 
S.E.2d 279 (1991) 
10. Legislative history accompanying sectioi 
1396a(aX17) points to only "mcome spend down" a 
a mandatory federal requirement See S. Rep. No 
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., repnnted w 1965 U.S 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943. 
11. See, e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C 
§1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use mcom 
spend-down but is silent regarding resource spend 
down ... Resource spend-down is thus permitted 
but not required, by the Medicaid statute and reg 
ulations"); Hamman, 1990 WL 284515 ("Th 
federal statute specifically requires the state to hav 
an mcome spend-down rule.... But there is n< 
similar requirement in the federal statute for a res 
ource. spend-down rule "); Hession v Illinois Dept 
of Pub. Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N E.2d 751, 75 
(1989X* Simply stated, we perceive nothing m sectioi 
1396a(aX17) which precludes a State that particip 
ates m the Medicaid program from using the reso 
urce spend down methodology if it chooses to d< 
so."), Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub Aid, 163 111 
App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("sectioi 
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan t< 
utilize resource snend down in determining an aon 
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Iicant's eligibility for medical assistance benefits"), 
a/Fd, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989); Har-
nman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 
(Me. 1991)(court adopts prior holding of district 
court in this case that federal Medicaid statute "only 
permits, and does not require, a state to use an asset 
spend-down"); Bemowski v. Department of Pub. 
Welfare, 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106 
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the 
medically needy by participating States is optional 
and may be excluded entirely from a State's Medi-
caid program"). 
But see Ramsey, 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds 
"no authority in any category for a 'spend-down' 
of excess resources that is similar or identical to the 
expressly authorized 'spend-down' of excess 
income*); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops 
short of holding "resource spend down* discretio-
nary, stating that, although "§1396a(aX17)(D) only 
mentions income in instructing states to provide 
flexibility in their program application standards, we 
note that §1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's 
plan must 'provide for reasonable evaluation of any 
such income or resources'") 
12. See Utah Code Ann. §§26-18-1 to-11 
(1989 and Supp. 1991). 
13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to-48 
(1991). Utah has elected to provide assistance to the 
"medically needy." See Utah Code Admin. P. R455-
1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has 
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility det-
ermination, including the burial fund discussed 
earlier, are listed at Utah Code Admin. P. R810-
304-411(1991). 
14. *[T]he Division of Health Care Financing ... 
shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, 
and maintaining the Medicaid program ... in acco-
rdance with the provisions of this chapter and app-
licable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-
2.1 (1989Mcmphasis added); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-18-3(1) (Supp. 1991)("The department 
shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connec-
tion with the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act.*)(emphasis added). 
15. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 
(1991). 
16. In fact, one commentator states: 
It is not only conceivable, but a fact 
that some unprepared applicants' assets 
are reduced beyond the poverty level to 
bankruptcy because medical bills in that 
month exceed those resources which the 
applicant cannot preserve under the 
Utah Exemptions Act. It [is] to the 
applicant's advantage to put forth any 
plausible argument that a particular 
value should be counted as income 
rather than asset, if the reverse would 
result in excess assets. Excess assets 
mean a demal of Medicaid ehgibility; 
excess income means that the applicant 
will be required to shoulder more of [his 
or] her health care costs for that month. 
Ken Bresm, Utah*s Medicaid Program: A Senior's 
Eligibility Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. 
Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988) (emphasis addedXfootnote 
omitted). 
18. We agree with most courts which have consid-
ered the issue and believe the adoption of "resource 
spend down" is good public policy. See e.g., Foley, 
1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spend-down 
provision furthers the general purpose of the Medi-
caid program); Harnman, 1990 WL 284515 
("Clearly, if the goal of Medicaid is to assist indiv-
iduals who are medically needy—defined as 
having insufficient income or resources to meet the 
cost of necessary medical services-the sensible 
solution is the spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 
N.E.2d at 823 (a state's adoption of resource spend 
down "would be in conformity with the purpose and 
spirit of the Act"); Kempson, 397 S.E.2d at 318 
("Our review of the case law reveals a pattern where 
Medicaid applicants are blmdsided by this eligibility 
requirement simply because it is so illogical. Appli-
cants who otherwise qualify are denied coverage 
because they have several hundred dollars above the 
reserve asset limit while at the same time they are 
liable for tens of thousands of dollars worth of 
medical bills.") 
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility 
criteria for Medicaid benefits is not one for the 
courts to make. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part 
and dissenting in part): 
I concur with part I of the main opinion 
and dissent from part II. 
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may 
have been eligible for Medicaid by spending 
down his or her assets is a policy decision 
delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code 
Ann. §26-18-4(1) (1989). We review for 
reasonableness an agency's policy based on a 
legislative grant of discretion to interpret a 
statute. See Morton Int*U Inc. v. Auditing 
Div. State Tax Comm% 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991).i 
I do not believe the policy adopted by 
DHCF is reasonable since eligibility is deter-
mined by when the medically needy applicant 
applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, 
the applicant who is savvy enough to spend 
down his or her assets before applying for 
medicaid would be eligible, while the applicant 
who applies for benefits before spending down 
is not eligible. Because that agency policy is 
not reasonable, I would allow Allen to spend 
down his assets before his eligibility is deter-
mined. 
I would therefore reverse and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. §26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an 
expression of intent to limit coverage. The Legisla-
ture's concern for economy and efficiency in the ad-
ministration of the program simply does not have 
any logical relationship to the intended coverage of 
the program. 
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House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965 
[To accompany H.R. 6675] 
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DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE 
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965 
Senate July 9, July 28, 1965 
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out. 
SENATE REPORT NO. 404 
HE Corr.:r.i::ee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6675' 
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social 
Security Ac: with a supplementary health benefits program ar.d an ex-
panded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the Federal-
State public assistance programs, and for other purposes, having consid-
ered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend 
that the bi'.i dc pass. 
PART I 
I. BRIEF SUMMARY 
The overall purpose of H.R. 667S is as follows: 
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical 
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new 
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the 
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other 
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical 
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled, 
and families with dependent children. 
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled 
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-year 
program ox "special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care 
and services for needy children (including those who arc emotionally dis-
turbed) of school age or preschool age. 
G 
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6. IMPROVEMENT AND E X T F X S I O X OF KERR-MILLS 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(a) Background 
The provision of medical care for the needy has kr.g been a responsi-
bility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years, 
tht Fcdtr^] Government has assisted the States and localities in carry-
ing this responsibility by participating in the cos: of the care provided. 
Ur.cer the original Social Security A.ct, it was possible for the States, 
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could 
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act 
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in be-
half of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children—the so-
called vendor payments. 
5v.-vera! tiir.es since 1950, the Congress has liberalized the provisions 
c: h.w under which the States administer the State-Federal program of 
:r.:ical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was 
in 1950 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program 
v. as authorized. This legislation ofYers generous Federal matching to 
v able the States t : pruvidc medical care in behalf of aged persons who 
h v * enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for 
:n. heal care costs. This program has grown to the pjint where 40 States 
r t d 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged 
\. : r : aided in March 1955. Furthermore, medical care as a part of the 
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years 
r::*ii, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some 
it.-r.is of medical care for at least some of the needy. 
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which 
States operate their medical assistance programs so as to make medical 
services for the needy more generally available. To accomplish this ob-
jective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a 
new title in the Social Security Act—"Title X I X : Grants to the States 
for Medical Assistance Programs." 
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967, 
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching 
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would 
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the 
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate 
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and 
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent 
children), title X (aid to the blind), title XIV (aid to the permanently 
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Pro-
grams of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be 
optional with the States. 
(b) State plan requirements 
(1) Standard provisions 
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of require-
ments for State plans which are either identical to the existing provi-
sions of law or are merely conforming changes. These are: 
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the 
State, 
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for 
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness. 
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary 
may from time to time require. 
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or 
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to pur-
poses directly connected with the administration of the plan. 
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance 
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such as-
sistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness. 
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be 
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye or 
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select. 
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who arc 
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom. 
(2) Additions to standard provisions 
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the 
committee bill contains several other plan requirements which are either 
new or changed over provisions currently in the law. 
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State 
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expendi-
tures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial par-
ticipation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This pro-
vision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local 
funds for financing of any part of the program not afreet the amount, 
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the 
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider 
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire non-
Federal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives, 
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent 
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy. 
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles 
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods 
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the 
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the require-
ment that such methods must include provisions for utilization of pro-
fessional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is im-
portant that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified per-
sonnel in the administration of the program including both medical and 
other professional staff. 
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan in-
clude a description of the standards, methods, and administrative ar-
rangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in 
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no author-
ity to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect 
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is some-
what analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assist-
ance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requir-
ing States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing and maintaining standards for private or public institutions in \vhi< 
recipients may receive care or services. 
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after Jui 
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standan 
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) n 
lating to protection against fire and other hazards to the health and saf< 
ty of individuals, which arc established by the Secretary of Health, Edt 
cation, and Welfare. The committee assumes that the standards pr« 
scribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those pre 
scribed by the Secretary. 
The House bill provided that the State or local agency administcrinj 
the State plan under title XIX shall be the same agency which is cur 
rciitly administering either title I (old-age assistance) or that part o 
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medica 
assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relat-
ing to the aged is State supervised, the same State agency shall super-
vise the administration of title XIX. 
The committee believes that the States should be given the opportun^ 
::y to select the agency they wish to administer the program. A number 
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief 
that the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility 
under this program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to 
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility 
for medical assistance be made by the State or local agency administer-
ing State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees 
with the statement in the House report that the welfare agencies have 
''long experience and skill in determination of eligibility." 
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on 
the date a State submits its title XIX plan, the State agency administer-
ing or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind un-
der title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the 
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new 
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or super-
vise the administration of the portion of the title XIX plan which re-
lates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining 
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered 
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan. 
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agen-
cies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types 
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under 
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to 
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care 
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of 
care in many medical institutions are not now at a satisfactory level and 
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will 
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these stan-
dards will be enforced by the appropriate State body. 
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include 
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and 
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was 
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use 
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the ef-
fect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for 
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions 
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the qual-
ity of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this 
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive 
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such pro-
cedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with med-
ical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to 
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of 
services under the State plan. 
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation o: all State 
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation. 
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance 
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include 
provision : : : medical assistance for all individuals receiving ai : or as-
sistance unler State plans approved under titles I, IV, X, 'XIV, and XVI. 
It is only if this group is provided for that States may inclule medical 
assistance tc the less needy. 
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons 
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must net be less 
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid 
jnder any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration, 
ind scope o: medical assistance made available must be the same for all 
;uch persons. This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy 
lided un-rrr the federally aided categories of assistance. 
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their pr:grr.:r.s to 
nclude assistance for persons who come within the various categories of 
issistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet 
heir needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals 
hall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that mace avail-
ble for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was in-
luded in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no 
?ss comprehensive care than those who are not as needy. 
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not re-
eiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determina-
on of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among 
ic people who, except for their income and resources, would be recip-
mts of money for maintenance under the other public assistance pro-
rams. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be 
jmparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a 
)mpa:ability for that set for families with children who, except for 
icir income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope, 
nour.c, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these 
•oups must be equal. 
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this pro-
sion as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in insti-
tions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participa-
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t JH is authorized only \\ith respect to recipients acred 65 : 1 o\cr in 
r-cntal and tubercu1osis mstitJtions so it woold not be : r : -o ; r iu tc to 
-c'uee them within the scope of this pro\Mon 
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance 
The committee bill would make more specific a pro\ lsion now in the 
\\w that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the 
p an, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives 
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources 
which indiwduals may hold and be eligible for aid, thc\ r ^ s t do so by 
maintaining a comparability among the \arious categorical groups of needy 
;-ople. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be 
:'-at \\h ch is applicable for the eligibility of the needy agea, for example, 
--?11 be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the chg'bil-
* for the necd\ bhnd and disabled; and must :/so ha\e a Cvmpirau'iity 
*, the standards used to dcter^ ne the ergibilit} of those \ ro are to re-
c. \e mec cal assis*ance as n^cd) child-cn and t^e patents c c*her ^ ' a -
* ^ es caring for them 
ViOther pioMbon is included that requires States to take ' to account 
~i\ sucn income and resources as (determined :n accordance with * ^n-
-~
z
 r*~cscr,bed b\ the SccrctarO, arc actualH a\aiiable to v.c arp, caT t 
.,: recipient and as would not be disregarded (or set r^de for :itu~e 
• LCCO in determining the eligibility for and the amount of x^e ?"a or as-
- r*r.nce in the form of money pauiKnts for an> such ?ppl cant or re-
c p'ent under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriately ap-
z. .cable to him. Income and resources taken into account, furthermore, 
~ :st be reasonabl\ e\aluated by the States These pro\ isions are de-
s
 g-cd so that the States will not assume the aAailabf.it> of income which 
r">\ not, in fact be a\ailable or o\erevaluate income and resoirce* which 
are a\ailable. Examples of income assumed include support orders from 
« js^nt lathers, which ha\e not been paid or contributions frum re'atnes 
which are not in reality recened by the needy individual. 
The committee has heard of hardships on certain indiuduals by re-
quiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed 
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to sup-
port each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their 
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled chil-
dren even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for sup-
port may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for 
medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements 
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among 
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their 
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than 
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who arc blind 
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made 
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, will be taken into account 
by the State in determining whether the individual appl)ing for medical 
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance. 
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weak-
nesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under 
the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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grams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the fi-
nancial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income 
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided un-
der the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the 
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical as-
sistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the 
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the 
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the con-
sideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the 
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical 
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the 
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or oth-
erwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligi-
ble for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be 
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both 
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the 
medical care he requires. 
This determination must be made by the agency administering the old-
age assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency. 
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the indi-
vidual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount. 
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that de-
scribed below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items 
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources 
which would bring the individual's income below the amount established 
as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce 
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for 
his maintenance. 
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit 
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any 
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan. 
Xo deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with re-
spect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This pro-
vision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States 
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided under 
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hos-
pital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the 
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that 
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or re-
sources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level) 
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall 
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary 
and included in the State plan. 
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a 
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the 
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income 
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment 
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital 
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this 
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provision, which it is expected will protect the income and resources ; 
individual has which are necessary for his nonmedical needs. 
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisio 
of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in connccti< 
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits. The c:mmittee 
concerned that hospitalization be readily available to needy persons ai 
that the necessity of their paying deductibles or cost sharing shall not 
a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their receiving i 
hospitalization they need. For this reason, the committee's ':!'.'. provid 
that the States make provisions, for individuals 65 years or older wl 
are included in the new plan, of the cost of any deductible or cost sharii 
imposed with respect to individuals under the program established by t 
hospital insurance provisions of the bill. 
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payrr.:nt in fi 
of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program esta 
iished by part B of title XVIII. In the event, however, the S:a:e plan pr 
vides for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, such porti 
shall be determined on a basis reasonably related to the individual's i 
come, or income and resources and in conformity with standards issu 
by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to issue standards—unc 
this provision which, it is expected, will protect the income :rd resourc 
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the States. Su 
standards shall protect the income and resources of the individual need 
for his maintenance and provide assurance that the responsibility plac 
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burden on the 
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged pi 
gram now provide that the States may not impose a lien against t 
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical • 
sistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning 
correct payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts c 
rectly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death a 
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee t 
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recovery would 
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is under i 
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
(e) Scope and definition of medical services 
"Medical assistance*' is defined under the bill to mean pa\ment of 
or part of the cost of care and sen-ices for individuals who would 
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), ? 
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 4C6 
(1) with whom the child is living, or who arc 65 years of age and ok 
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and 
sources arc insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, 
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of m 
ical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the indi\ 
ual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the progr 
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children 
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and tl 
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except 
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TITLE XIX. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
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This Title is referred to in 7 USCS §§ 2026, 3178; 8 USCS § 1522: 12 USCS 
§§ 1715w, 1715Z-7: 25 USCS §1622; 38 USCS §§622, 4108: -2 USCS 
§§ 242b, 254a-1, 254b, 254c, 254e, 254h, 254n, 300e, 300e-6, 300m-6. 300z-5. 
602, 603, 606, 614, 632a, 671, 671, 673, 705, 709, 1301, 1306, 130S, 1309, 
1310, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1320a-l, 1320a-2, 1320a-3, 1320a-5, 1320a-7. 1320a-
7a, 1320a-8, 1320b-2, 1320b-3, 1320b-4. 1320b-5. 1320c-2, 1320c-iO, 13S2. 
13822. !3S2h, 13S2i, 1383c. 1395b-l, 1395%. !395x. 1395yJ--1395z. !395cc. 
1395mm. 1395H, 1395w. 1395ww. 1997. 3C:3. 3026, 3035b,""S624 
§ 1396. Appropriations 
For the purpose of enabling each State. 2S far as practicable under the 
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of 
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individu-
als, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help 
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or 
self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year 
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et 
seq.]. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making 
payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the 
Secretary, State plans for medical assistance. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, i965, P. L. 
89-97, Title I, Part 2, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343: Dec. 31, 1973, P. L. 93-233, 
§ 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, Division B. Title VI. 
Subtitle D, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.) 
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(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all 
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the 
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of 
applicants or recipients of assistance under the plan who are not 
receiving aid or assistance under anv plan of the State approved under 
title I. X, XIV, or XVI. or part A of'title IV [-2 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 13S1 et seq.. 601 et seq.], and with respect to 
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under 
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]. based on the variations between 
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility 
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are 
consistent with the objectives o\ this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B) 
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, 
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case ot any applicant 
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for 
aid or assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the 
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], 
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income 
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be 
disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility 
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evalua-
tion of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account 
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or 
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient 
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or 
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(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program 
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in 
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not 
eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the 
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into 
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs 
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for 
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under 
State law; 
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(17) except as provided in subsections (1X3). and (mX4)[J include reasonable standards (which shall 
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
difier with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under 
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I, 
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et 
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security inoome benefits are not being paid 
under title XVI (42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban, 
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the 
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.). (B) provide 
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for Uking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accord 
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the a 
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or ass 
the form of money payments under any plan of the State approved under title I, X XIV, o 
part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq.( 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq.t 1381 et seq., 601 ct $ 
have paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits under title XVI | 
§§ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in dctern 
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, ( Q provide for reasonable evaluation of 
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any 
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipie 
individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to States 
participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), 
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USC 
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such program); and p 
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by uking into accot 
to the extent prescribed by the Secreury, the costs (whether in the form of insurance 
payments made to the Sute under section 1903(f)(2)(B) [42 USCS § 1396b(0(2)(B)]. or oth 
regardless of whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of th 
political subdivision thereof) incurred for medical care or for any other type of ren 
recognized under Sute law; 
392 
